Othering in Vietnam

In chapter one of Crisis of Conscience, Michael Novak argues that the United States never made up its mind as to whether it was fighting the Chinese people or the ideology of Communism. In choosing a people and an ideology as an enemy, but not differentiating clearly between the two, the United States "muddled" the war by not declaring a concise enemy or its concise intentions (23).
What effect does it have on the ideology of the protagonist when it is unable to dissociate the people it is othering from the ideology it is othering? What happens when we don't give the enemy a voice or allow them a place at the table like the United States did during not so unconditional negotiations?
[Was this productive for religious support of the war by creating an identity for the enemy that was so opposite of the American ideal? Or was this negative for religious support, causing confusion as to which--ideology or people--was the enemy?]
And in the second chapter, Abraham Heschel caused me to wonder if in defining the enemy, was it ever a question to Americans whether the enemy was human first, Chinese or Vietnamese first, (ir)religious first, or Communist first? What do we do when they aren't given the voice to say what they are first?